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Abstract: A Fee Game is a cooperative game with incomplete information the
ex post realizations of which show side payment character. The game appears in
coalitional function form depending on the 'types' of the players which are ran-
domly chosen and about which the players have private information. We specify
incentive compatible mechanisms and show that with a natural condition the core
of the game is not empty: it contains constant mechanisms.
1 Introduction
This paper deals with cooperative games and mechanism design. Incomplete infor-
mation (or imperfect information) is a quite common subject within the framework
of non-cooperative game theory. With cooperative game theory (the coalitional
function) incomplete information was rst introduced by Harsanyi-Selten (1972),
however, they did not discuss incentive compatible mechanisms. Hence, in their
framework, which is essentially the one of Nash bargaining, players would have an
incentive to misrepresent their type. Myerson (1984) introduced Bayesian incen-
tive compatible mechanisms within this framework; he also discussed a version of
the Nash Bargaining solution and a version of the Shapley value in the context of
a general coalitional form with incomplete information.
In Myerson's context players have nitely many decisions to agree upon but are
permitted to randomize. As a consequence the coalitional function which is ob-
tained by considering for each coalition the utilities available by joint (correlated)
randomization is of NTU-type such that the values are polyhedral sets. Mecha-
nisms, therefore, are mappings from types into joint distributions over the deci-
sions. Again, if one considers the utilities available to a coalition by the application
of such mechanisms, one obtains polyhedral sets.
By contrast the model we prefer admits for continuum of utility vectors to be avail-
able to each coalition, this is the familiar framework of NTU-games. However, the
information available to players about the NTU-game at hand may be of private
nature and governed by an a priori probability which is common knowledge to
all the players.
Thus, the coalitional function depends on certain states of nature and the players
observe dierent aspects of this state of nature. Following the tradition established
by Harsanyi, we model the states of nature as a product of observations available
to the dierent players. The relevant part of a state of nature which can be
observed of a player is traditionally called his type. In order to introduce an
example, let us think of a game with three players, two of which would like to
cooperate in an economic enterprise in a foreign country. They would have to
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that the court will require a fee for the registration which may depend on the
total worth of the contract. Also, each player may have expenses with respect
to consulting experts on legal procedures and taxes in the foreign country; the
actual amounts of these expenses are possibly not veriable, hence part of this is
private information of the players.However, they will specically announce these
expenses in the contract and the court will have to regard all these data, public
and private information as well. We could introduce a third player representing
a bank which has good connections to the foreign country or actually sustains a
branch in that country. This player may have additional information which he
may disclose to all parties involved including the court.
Obviously, the two players mentioned rst will have to consider the benets of
cooperating with the banker, in view of the fact that everyone has private infor-
mation which he may have an incentive to misrepresent. In addition the court
which may be called upon to enforce the contract, should be aware of possible
misrepresentation; most specically the court should have a strong interest in reg-
istering incentive compatible mechanisms only such that players are induced to
report the true type within the contract.
Methodically, this problem is basically one of cooperative game theory, but the
introduction of mechanisms calls for incentive compatibility. Eventually the play-
ers will have to agree upon some contract; in cooperative game theory one should
ask for a suitable denition of the core.
We will provide a denition of the core of a game with incomplete information
and show that it is not empty given certain conditions, e.g. on every ex post
cooperative game.
We would like to add a short hint concerning general equilibrium theory. In this
context incomplete information is e.g. discussed by Vohra (1997)(see also Allen
(1991)). As is frequently observed, it turns out that the core might be empty
even if we have nice standard conditions concerning the exchange economy in
question. It would be nice to somehow connect the two models since with complete
information the core of the market game to be derived from the exchange economy
is a close relative of the core of the economy.
We start out by specifying the model.
Denition 1.1 An n-person cooperative game with incomplete information (a
C.I.I.game) is a set of data
  = (I;T;p; X;U) (1)
including the following ingredients (that are interpreted accordingly).
1. I = f1;:::;ng is the set of players;
2. T = T1 :::Tn is the cartesian product of nite sets Ti (i 2 I), Ti is the
set of types of player i.
3. p > 0 is a probability on T.
4. Next
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is the set of possible contracts, xi is the share of player i at a contract
x = (x1;:::;xn) (they could distribute less than the full value available). In
particular, if a coalition
S 2 P := fT  
g
agrees to cooperate by contract, then they register some x 2 XS with





We assume that, technically, I Rn
S is imbedded in I Rn by projection (though
the zero coordinate assigned to players not in S are not interpreted). More-
over, TS denotes the cartesian product
Q
i2S Ti.
5. Finally, U represents the family of utility functions. In general, the utility





where for some t 2 TS :=
Q
i2S Ti; the utility function
U
S;t
i : XS  ! I R
of player i is dened on contracts of S, i.e., contracts x 2 XS that distribute
a share of what can be achieved by the members of S.
This way we have nished the description of the general (N.T.U.) game with
incomplete information.
In case of complete information or "ex post", i.e., if some t 2 T is known to the
players, a C.I.I.-game   results in a traditional NTU game which is specied by
(ex post) feasible sets of utilities for each coalition, i.e. for every realisation t 2 T
of the types we have an ex post game given by
V t(S) = f(U
S;tjS
i (x))i2S j x 2 XSg (S 2 P) (4)
However, some geometric properties of the feasible sets (convexity, comprehen-
siveness) should be ensured by proper assumptions concerning the functions U
S;t
i .
We would like to consider a class of functions which generates "side payment
games", but also includes the denite in
uence of private information. The re-
sulting game will be called a fee game.
To this end, we start out with the traditional side payment or T.U. concept of
game theory, the characteristic or coalitional function. That is, we specify a
mapping,
v : P  ! I R; v(;) = 0 (5)
to be interpreted as a 'side payment game'. Assuming a universally accepted util-
ity scale in the presence of full information, v(S) is to be seen as a monetary value
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observe all random in
uence, the establishment and enforcement of contracts is a
dicult procedure which is to be supervised by some powerful agency, the referee
or rather the court.
Therefore, we assume that there is a system of fees or a taxation rule (a fee
schedule) represented by a set of vectors
b = (bS;t)S2P;t2TS ; bS;t 2 I Rn
S: (6)
The meaning is that, if a contract x 2 X of coalition S is registered with the
court, then player i 2 S is (legally) required to pay a certain fee or an amount of
taxes proportional to the total of this contract.
To be more precise, if we write e = (1;:::;1) 2 I Rn
+ and
eS = (0;:::;1;:::;1;:::;0;:::;0) 2 I Rn
S
then the total of the contract x 2 XS is




and the proportionality factor is b
S;t
i for player i if the types of the players are
given by t 2 T and cooperation takes place in S 2 P.
The (preliminary, naive) rules of the game are described as follows: a coalition
S 2 P may register a contract x 2 XS. Then by cooperation (which can be
enforced by the registering agency, the court), they may aquire a monetary value
(S). However, player i is required to pay a fee towards the court, thus his utility
resulting from x is
U
S;t
i (x) = v(S)(xi   (eSx)b
S;t
i ): (8)
Concentrating our above remarks we come up with
Denition 1.2 A C.I.I. game   is said to be a fee game if there is a coalitional
function v and a fee schedule b (see (5) and (6)) such that the utility functions
collected in U are given by (8).
In this context, x 2 XS achieves a certain monetarian character, thus normaliza-
tion may become questionable. But as the fee schedule is assumed to be linear,
we may accept this concession for the moment. Note that the term 'fee' implicitly
suggests that the players indeed have to pay something (hence b
 is nonnegative)
and that, for some xed contract, the utility of a player is nonnegative (hence b

does not exceed 1:) That is, we will assume that
0  b
  1 (9)
holds true.
Let us again shortly consider the "ex post" situation, i.e., the state of the world
in which some t 2 T is commonly known.
In this case, the N.T.U. game (ex post) suggested by (4) has obviously side pay-
ment character (each feasible set is bounded by a hyperplane), hence we may as
well introduce the "ex post T.U. game" given for xed t 2 T by
vt : P  ! I R; vt(S) = v(S)(1   bS;tjS(S)) (S 2 P): (10)
Clearly, vt(S) = eSUS;t(x) whenever x is Pareto ecient in vt(S).2 INCENTIVE COMPATIBLE MECHANISMS 5
2 Incentive Compatible Mechanisms
Let us now change the story so as to incorporate incomplete information. In this
scenario, the types are chosen at random, the distribution is given by p. Player
i observes the realisation of his own type ti only. However, p and all other data
are common knowledge; thus it makes sense that player i computes conditional
expectations of his data given he observes his type. As a consequence, we have to
enhance the set-up by the introducing an abstract probability space, say (
; F;P)
together with a random variable  : 
  ! T which selects types at random. The
distribution of  is given by p, i.e., we have
p() = P() = P   1(); i.e., P( = t) = p(ftg) =: pt (t 2 T): (11)
As in most probabilistic models in Statistics or Economics it is easily seen that
all data depending on chance can be computed by means of p. That is, it suces
to have knowledge of the distribution of  in order to compute (conditional)
expectations or to decide (later on) whether a mechanism is incentive compatible
(Denition 2.2).
In view of this set up, coalition S may bargain about some contract x 2 XS, we
assume that this is done "ex ante", i.e., before the types are being observed. The
general agreement the coalition nally wants to register will include the disclosure
of types, thus it will be contingent with types t 2 TS =
Q
i2S
Ti. Such kind of
agreement causes the players to behave strategically. Generally, the contingent
set of contracts is called a mechanism.
Denition 2.1 A mechanism for coalition S is a mapping S : TS  ! XS.
The interpretation is clearly that player i 2 S, having observed his "type" ti 2 Ti,
announces his observation, upon which S(tS) = S;tS with tS = (ti)i2S is
executed by the court.
In view of this, the players may compute their expected utility conditioned on
their observation, this quantity for i 2 S is computed by
^ US







 i = ti

(12)
If   is a fee game, then (12) may be specied to
^ US









 i = ti

(13)
Now, in view of an enforcable mechanism  or S, player i develops strategic
behavior, he may have an incentive to misrepresent his type. If he observes ti 2 Ti
but announces si 2 Ti, then his utility is given by
^ US




 i = ti

: (14)
The notation t = (t i;ti) for splitting up a vector for all players in i0s coordinate
and the coordinates of all other players will be used throughout. This way we are
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Denition 2.2 Let S be a mechanism for coalition S 2 P: S is incentive
compatible (for short IC ) if, for all i 2 I and all si;ti 2 Ti, it follows that
^ US
i (;ti)  ^ US
i (;ti;si) (15)
holds true. That is, given that all other players represent their types truthfully,
player i cannot improve his payo by misrepresenting his type.
At this instant a familiar remark is in order. Given a mechanism S : TS  ! XS;
players will behave strategically and ponder about the announcement of their type
once they observe its true value. That is, there arises a noncooperative game, say
 ;S: Within this game, the strategies for player i are 'observation dependent
announcements', i.e., mappings i : Ti  ! Ti; (i 2 S) resulting in S tupels




For S to be incentive compatible means that the strategy 'telling the truth' (i.e.,




S j S : TS  ! XS; isIC
o
(16)
the set of IC mechanisms feasible for coalition S: When S commences bargaining ex
ante , then the utily vectors available from the formation of agreement concerning










j  2 MS

: (17)
This way we have constructed a mapping
V M : P  ! I Rn
S (18)
which apparently has the character of a cooperative game. However, should we
assume that   is a fee game and hence represents side-payment character, then
nevertheless in general V M will be an NTU game. This is an important ob-
servation: in view of incomplete information and the necessary passage to IC
mechanism the TU property of a cooperative game is subdued.
The geometric shape of the utility sets involved in V M is cleared by the follow-
ing theorem, which is traditional in other contexts (see Myersom (1984)and also
Rosenm uller (1992)) :
Theorem 2.3 Let   be a fee game. Then MS and V M are nonempty, closed
polyhedra. If one restricts the denitions to nonnegative mechanisms (MS+),
then the corresponding quantities are nonempty, compact polyhedra.
Proof: Since constant mechanisms are IC, the quantities involved are nonempty
sets. The natural linear structure of the set f j  : TS  ! Xg = X
TS
S is the one
of I RTS. With regards to this structure, the inequalities listed in equations (15)3 THE CORE OF A FEE-GAME 7
are linear ones as the coordinates of  appear only linearly. This is a consequence
of the fact that within ( 15) we just form conditional expectations. Therefore,
MS is the set of solutions of a System of linear inequalities, hence convex and
closed.
Next, if we write US;t(x) = (U
S;t
i (x))i2S = (v(S)(x   (eSx)b
S;t
i ))i2S, then the























2 is an element of MS in view of the rst step of our proof. Similarly,
the fact that V M is closed followes from the continuity of the mappings involved.
qed.
3 The Core of a Fee-Game
Within this section we speak about fee games only, nevertheless some denitions
apply for a more general class as well.
Since V M has the character of an NTU game the core of the game, written
C(V M) is well dened. We may, however, discuss matters in terms of mechanisms
instead of utilities, for this case we present a formal denition:
Denition 3.1 1. We shall say that a mechanism  2 M = MI is domi-














holds true for all i 2 S with a strict inequality for at least one i 2 S:
2. The core of a game   is given by
C( ) :=
n
 2 M j6 9S 2 P;S 2 MS : S domS :
o
(21)
A well known condition for the core (of V M) to be nonempty is that the game
is balanced (cf. Shapley (1973)). But this is an ad hoc condition as far as our
present context is concerned, since we do not have the slightest idea concerning
such properties of V M:
The general discussion of the core might be a formidable task, presently we shall
restrict ourselves to the question as to whether there exist constant mechanisms
in the core. Since there is so much linearity in the model it may then be useful
to consider the 'expected' games (TU and NTU) which the players are facing ex
ante when restricted to constant mechanisms. The TU version is given by
 v : = Ev : P  ! I R
 v(S) = v(S)(1   EbS;jS(S)) (S 2 P): (22)? J. ROSENM ULLER : FEE GAMES ? 8
This game may or may not have a nonempty core according to whether it is
balanced or not. Naturally, we call this the ex ante core (of   or of  v;) the
denition is given by
C( v) := fu 2 I Rn j u(S)   v(S) (S 2 P:)g (23)
In any case the existence of a nonempty core for  v is established by familiar
conditions. As a rst and most simple step we should, therefore, discuss the
question as to whether from this we can derive some rst clue concerning the
existence of a nonempty core of  :
Now, those utility vectors  u 2 I Rn which are feasible distributions of utility for
the grand coalition with respect to  v(I) my be generated by constant mechanisms
 x 2 X = XI via
 u = v(I)( x   EbI;
 ) (24)
On the other hand, if we are given a utility distribution  u we may construct a







Theorem 3.2 Let  u 2 C( v) be an element of the ex ante core and let  x be gener-
ated by equation (25). Then  x constitutes an IC{contract for the grand coalition
and
 x 2 C( ) (26)
holds true.
Proof: First of all,  x is immediately seen to be a contract for the grand coalition
by summing over the cordinates, using (24), and observing that  u(I) =  v(I) follows
from  u 2 C( v). Incentive compatibility is clear since we are dealing with a constant
mechanism. It remains to be shown that the mechanism is located within the core
of  .
Dene the utility for player i in mediis , when  x is applied, to be
 u
ti
i : = v(I)E( xi   b
I;
i j i = ti)
= v(I)( xi   Eb
I;
i j i = ti):
(27)
Assume now per absurdum that  x 2 C(v) does not hold true. Then there is a
coalition S and a mechanism  suitable for S such that
 u
ti










i j i = ti

(i 2 S) (28)
holds true with the additional understanding, that for at least one i 2 S; there is
a strict inequality in ( 28). Dene now (~ xs)s2TS to be a set of contracts feasible
for S such that the following two conditions are satised:
~ xs is Pareto ecient for S for everys 2 TS; (29)? J. ROSENM ULLER : FEE GAMES ? 9
S;s   (eSS;s)bS;s  ~ xs   bS;s (s 2 TS); (30)
this is possible for every s 2 TS in view of our assumption ensuring that bS;s  eS
holds true (see (9)) Of course, the set (~ xs)s2TS does not necessarily constitute
an IC{mechanism, however it could be called a mechanism. Consider now the
expected utility in mediis for player i 2 S with respect to this mechanism, given







i   (eS~ xjS)b
S;jS




i   u
ti
i ; (31)
where again at least one inequality is strict. We may, therefore, derive the follow-



























i   (eS~ xjS)b
S;jS





































This however is a contradiction to our assumption according to which  u is an
element of the core of  v; qed.
Corollary 3.3 Let   be a fee game. Suppose that every ex post game vt (cf.
(10)) has a nonempty core. Then the core of   is nonempty.
The Proof is easy since, with a slight abuse of notation one can verify at once
that
C( v) = C(E (v)) = E (C(v)) 6= ; (33)
holds true.
The condition of Corollary 3.3 is not an unnatural one and cannot be called ad
hoc. The ex post game vt as dened in (10) re
ects the impact of the taxation
enforcement induced by the court, as compared to the situation with full informa-
tion and no fee being required which is represented by the coalitional function (5).
Since taxation decreases the payo to the players, the existence of a nonempty core
may be destroyed, this is exactly seen by inspecting the two games in question.
Nevertheless, the more dicult question (and the more rewarding one) will arise
from studying nonconstant mechanisms in the core, computing their extreme
points and relating these results to exchange economies.? J. ROSENM ULLER : FEE GAMES ? 10
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